Goals For Better, For Worse [Part One] - Engineering Entertainment

Goals For Better, For Worse [Part One] - Engineering Entertainment Having now followed K League in multiple capacities for the last twelve years, Matthew Binns takes a look back at some of the various rules implemented over the last decade, the impact they have had on the pitch and whether they could be deemed a success. The first part of this series, the focus is placed on the change in first tie-breaker from Goal Difference to Goals For in order to forcibly extract more attacking football from a division that was admittedly looking stagnant.  A version of this article first appeared as an early access on July 17th, 2026 over on our Patreon Ahead of the 2016 season, Korean football was facing a perceived crisis of cagey, low-scoring affairs, where defensive solidity had begun to outweigh the benefits of moving forward. With goals seemingly drying up and attendances dwindling, the proposed solution was not to wait for tactical revolution, nor the fostering of a new generation of striking talent, but a regulative attack on defensive football that sought to rewire managers’ approach to the game. For two years prior to intervention, sitting in the stands of K League Classic stadiums often felt like witnessing an exhaustive masterclass in risk mitigation. This tactical paralysis spawned from an unspoken managerial consensus: success through solidity. Perhaps it made sense given the environment in which it festered. With just twelve teams in the table, plus the introduction of relegation at the end of the 2012 season and the removal of Championship play-offs a couple of years before that, teams were no longer afforded the free-hit of falling down the table without consequence, nor the concern of fading out in a title race due to the second opportunity provided by knockout football. A combination of risk-aversion to stave off previously unknown threats, a lack of teams in the division and managerial faces that were rarely removed from the carousel was now culminating in a dirge of monotony on the pitch. Not only that, but the required publication of player wage expenditure from the 2013 season onwards was also theorised to factor. The initial realisation of the disproportion between actual expenditure and match-day revenue led to belt-tightening in boardrooms and more "value-for-money" tactics on the field. It also coincided with the rise of the Chinese Super League, a division whose clubs were aggressively signing star names through irresistible transfer sums and unmatchable player contracts. The K League had almost shifted into a selling league overnight. As a result, a barren landscape was forming from the drought in front of the net, with just 2.55 and 2.22 goals per game over the 2014 and 2015 seasons respectively, while neighbouring divisions such as J.League 1 (2.53 and 2.68) and the then expanding Chinese Super League were averaging considerably higher (2.75 and 2.8). Given the desire to emulate overseas divisions, stretching this beyond neighbouring leagues and into Europe & MLS further amplifies the issues, showing just how much the scoring of goals had dried up on the Korean peninsula. Korean football seemed to be trapped in a low block cycle, unable to move forward both on and off the field. If a team went 1-0 up, the game was effectively over. Managers would prefer to park the bus and ensure the points while those sides unable to muster a reply could find their own bus parked post-match, barricaded by protesting supporters. To further the point, a painful 36% and 33% of games across the 2014 and 2015 seasons respectively ended with just a single goal or less, meaning that over a third of supporters were attending matches knowing that there may well be little to cheer about come full time. At this time, K League as a product was already becoming a hard sell. Still reeling from the fallout of dwindling attendances brought on by a match-fixing scandal half a decade earlier, and constantly in the shadow of the ever-popular sport of baseball, providing an offering on the pitch that was far from entertaining was only serving to compound matters and further disinterest. Rather than await tactical innovation or the emergence of new managers with fresher ideas and untrodden pathways, The Korea Professional Football League took a regulatory shortcut in order to try and shock K League back to life. They realised that to lure the managers’ gaze towards attacking football, they would have to change the way in which the standings were calculated. By elevating Goals For (GF) above Goal Difference (GD) as the primary tie-breaker ahead of the 2016 season across both professional divisions of Korean football, the federation let fire a long-range administrative shot on defensive football. Overnight, winning in a chaotic 4-3 became superior to a solid 2-0 victory, with teams encouraged to keep attacking despite having a healthy lead as the impact of conceding a consolation was reduced. It was somewhat of a radical gamble given how much of an anomaly the prioritising of Goals For is on the global stage. Notably, USA's Major League Soccer (MLS) trialed it for a single season in 2012 as their first tie-breaker before switching to Total Wins a year later after feeling it was more important to reward victories. Prior to 2012, the MLS had been facing goals per game averages of 2.53, 2.46 and 2.58 for three consecutive seasons (2009-2011), with the switch in preference to Goals For at least seeing it increase to 2.64 before governing bodies chose to change paths again. Admittedly, not entirely convincing numbers if you are evaluating its success in terms of on-field output, but enough evidence to suggest it lacked a negative impact and therefore was worth the roll of the dice. The K League announcement on the 18th January 2016, two months from the season start, was initially met with mixed reaction from across the league. While then younger managers such as Suwon Samsung Bluewings manager Seo Jung-won acknowledged that supporters wanted to see more attacking football and this was one way to achieve that, there was hesitation from more established figures such as then Seongnam FC boss Kim Hak-bum, who felt it undermined the importance of defending. Jeju United manager Cho Sung-hwan took a more measured approach , believing that it would not affect all 12 teams and only start to factor more consciously into play towards the end of the season when rankings may be tight. For additional context, Suwon Samsung Bluewings had scored the highest number of goals for the 2015 campaign whereas Seongnam FC recorded the lowest number of goals in the top half, yet had recorded the second best defence in the division. Interestingly, there is a decent case for Kim Hak-bum’s Seongnam side being one of the least entertaining sides during this nadir, and perhaps understandably so. The club moved under city council control ahead of the 2014 season following divestment from the Unification Church-backed Ilwha Sports in 2013. Restricted budgets meant the now-Magpie-branded outfit, had to face new realities and a focus on the defensive and the practical. Despite this, they did lift an FA Cup in 2015 and a respectable fifth place finish, so their approach was not entirely without merit. Regardless, Seongnam would limp into the second tier at the end of 2016, albeit with 47 goals, the sixth highest in the division. This would suggest not so much failure to adapt, but a failure to keep a hold the successful signing of the creative Tiago beyond half a campaign, seeing them resort to a more defensive setup for the latter half of the year, scoring 18 times in 20 games following his departure and just once in their last five post-split matches. The switch did seem to reap dividends on the field for the league as a whole though, with each team in the top flight that season recording 2.71 goals per game, an increase of 0.32 on the year previous and the highest since the league did away with play-offs. Overall, 618 goals were scored over 228 games of football, with tallies for 2014 and 2015 being at 506 and 546 respectively. The number of matches ending with just a single goal or less dropped significantly also, with fans running the risk of enduring such an encounter at the likelihood of 25%, a percentage that would fall even lower over the next four campaigns. The trend would sustain itself through the few seasons immediately after the rule change, with average goals per game continuing to come in at over 2.6. While there may well be other factors to consider, the tables suggested that the rule change had provoked a reaction in the league’s approach to attacking football through the number of goals scored. Furthermore, the likelihood of results with a goal or fewer had reduced considerably, initially dropping to 27.63% in 2016 before dropping further to 23..68% the season after. Fans were now attending stadiums once again confident in seeing teams score, which could perhaps be considered one of several contributing factors to an eventual rise in attendances. On the pitch, teams were now being more direct in their setup. Many teams in the 2014 and 2015 seasons had often preferred a 4-2-3-1 formation, with a preference for two defensive midfielders, while those teasing a back-three tended to restrict their wingbacks from moving forward. The term “Ten-Back” (텐백) often coined in reference to the defence-first setup many aside. It even slipped into manager lexicon with Jeonbuk Hyundai Motors manager Choi Kang-hee bemoaning it after Kim Hak-bum’s Seongnam side stifled them for 90 minutes in order to progress through in the FA Cup, before taunting his Seongnam counterpart on the style once more ahead of their Round 1 clash in 2015. The prioritisation of goals scored though saw teams make shifts on field. Teams utilizing a single defensive midfielder and attacking wingers ala Jeonbuk’s aggresive 4-1-4-1, or a more attacking 3-4-3 to balance defensive stability with counter-attacking sensibilities, adopted mid-campaign by struggling sides Incheon United, Jeju United and Jeonnam Dragons to help salvage their seasons. This was also reflected in the Golden Boot race, something that had become quite uninspiring given how few goals were required to win it. With three-time Golden Boot winner Dejan Damjanovic making the switch from FC Seoul to Beijing Guoan in 2013, the opportunity arose for other strikers to seize upon the opportunity. However, goals per game for the eventual victor dropped sharply, resulting in just 0.4 and 0.47 goals per appearance for 2014 and 2015 seasons respectively. Following the rule change, numbers picked up once more, with the Gwangju FC’s Jung Jo-gook storming the goalscoring table ahead of FC Seoul’s Adriano (15) and now-returned Dejan Damjanovic (13), as well as Jeonbuk’s Ricardo Lopes (13) and Seongnam’s half-season wonder Tiago (13). The trend would continue upwards for the following two seasons, peaking in 2018 with Gyeongnam’s stunning run to 2nd place thanks to the unstoppable force of their striker Marcão. Ultimately, it could be argued that strikers already plying their trade in the division were now benefiting from more forward-thinking tactics, while clubs were also perhaps equally encouraged to ensure adequate due diligence had been carried out in their scouting to sign quality additions from outside the league. Unfortunately, the trend could not be sustained forever, however, with the goals per game average declining slightly beyond the 2021 season, but nowhere near to the lows of the seasons prior to 2016. Interestingly, there is a case here for further influence for post-pandemic rule changes, one that will be explored in a later installment. However, for a while, the prioritisation of Goals For had led to a renewed emphasis of attacking football in Korea’s top flight. The intervention looked as if it had paid off, or at least provided the initial jolt required to ideally point football in a more forward-thinking direction both on and off the field. What was happening in the division below though, was something else entirely…